In the decades surrounding this topic, industrialized Western powers built vast empires in Asia and Africa, and Japan, after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, industrialized rapidly so that it would not be colonized itself. Japan copied Western models of industry, military organization, and empire, defeating China in 1895 and taking Taiwan. Because Japan was a small island nation with few natural resources, its growing factories depended on imported coal, iron, and cotton. This wider situation is the backdrop against which Japanese imperialism from 1900 to 1945 should be understood. Economic motives were largely the leading cause of Japanese imperialism, as seen through Japan’s need for raw materials for its industries and the business community’s push to protect its trade in Manchuria.

One way economic motives drove Japanese imperialism was through the need for raw materials, as seen in Documents 2, 5, and 6, which show Japan’s lack of resources and its dependence on imports. Document 5 is a 1937 New York Times article explaining that Japan’s offensive in northern China aimed to control the iron ore and coal of Shaanxi province, which Japan’s steel industry desperately needed. This document supports my argument because it demonstrates that Japan’s war in China was tied directly to resources for its industries. The author of Document 5 is an American journalist writing for American readers. Therefore, he may emphasize Japan’s hunger for raw materials, which means he presents the invasion mainly as a resource grab. This supports my argument because even an outside observer saw economics at the heart of Japanese expansion. Document 1 is a 1903 editorial in Japan’s leading business journal arguing that Japanese businessmen wanted war with Russia because Russian port taxes threatened to cut Japan out of the Manchurian trade. This document supports my argument because it demonstrates that business interests pushed for expansion decades before the 1930s.

Strategic and nationalist motives also mattered, as seen in Documents 3, 4, and 7, which show Japan seeking security against Russia and spreading its culture in conquered lands. Document 4 is a 1931 essay by Kanji Ishiwara arguing that Japan needed northern Manchuria to block Russia and stabilize its control over Korea. The author of Document 4 is a Japanese army officer stationed in Manchuria. Therefore, he may emphasize military security over trade, which means his essay shows how the army justified expansion as national defense. This qualifies my argument because military leaders, not just businessmen, pushed for empire. Document 7, a photograph of a Japanese language class in occupied Singapore published in a major Japanese newspaper, also shows Japan presenting itself as the leader of Asia while imposing its language.

An additional piece of evidence that supports my argument that economic motives were the leading cause is the U.S. oil embargo of 1941, which cut off most of Japan’s oil and led Japan to plan the conquest of the oil-rich Dutch East Indies. This evidence supports my argument because it demonstrates how Japan’s need for raw materials drove its expansion into Southeast Asia and its attack on Pearl Harbor.

Economic and strategic motives were intertwined, and even some Japanese experts doubted that empire paid. Konoe (Doc 2) blended economic fears with resentment of British and American power, while the economist Toichi Nawa (Doc 6) warned that empire building made Japan more dependent on imported raw materials, not less. This shows that economic motives drove imperialism largely because leaders believed empire would bring security, even when the economics did not add up.

Model answer written for this site in the class formulas from the Writing Guide.

Before 1900, most industrialized countries followed laissez-faire ideas, associated with Adam Smith, that governments should stay out of the economy. Industrialization created great wealth but also harsh working conditions and inequality, which led Karl Marx and other socialists to argue that workers or the state should control production. Some states, such as Meiji Japan, had already used government support to build industry quickly. This set the stage for the twentieth century because governments now had both a reason and a model for taking a larger role in their economies. Many states largely controlled their economies in this period, as seen through the Soviet Union’s Five-Year Plans and China’s Great Leap Forward.

Stalin’s Five-Year Plans support my argument that many states largely controlled their economies because they demonstrate how, beginning in 1928, the Soviet government set production targets for every factory, collectivized farms, and poured resources into heavy industry such as steel and coal. Because the state controlled all investment, the Soviet Union industrialized rapidly, but forced collectivization led to a famine that killed millions, especially in Ukraine.

Mao’s Great Leap Forward supports my argument because it demonstrates how, beginning in 1958, the Chinese Communist Party organized peasants into huge communes and ordered them to produce steel in backyard furnaces. Because the state controlled planting and labor, local officials reported false harvests to meet their targets, which resulted in a famine that killed tens of millions of people.

State control varied in degree and changed over time. In response to the Great Depression, democracies also expanded state control without abolishing private property: Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal created public works and regulated banks, and after 1945 Britain nationalized coal, railways, and steel and built a welfare state. Later, many states reduced their control, as China under Deng Xiaoping introduced market reforms after 1978, which shows that state control of economies rose and then fell across the twentieth century.

Model answer written for this site in the class formulas from the Writing Guide.